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First Impressions 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of issues of first impression 
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between 
October 2009 and March 2010.  This collection is organized by circuit. 
Each summary presents an issue of first impression, a brief 
analysis, and the court’s conclusion.  It is intended to give only the 
briefest synopsis of the first impression issue, not a comprehensive 
analysis.  This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will 
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point.  If a circuit 
does not appear on the list, it means that the editors did not identify any 
cases from the circuit for the specified time period that presented an issue 
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FIRST CIRCUIT 
Howe v. Townsend, 588 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION ONE: Whether “settlement agreements in class actions 
may establish cy pres funds.” Id. at 33. 
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ANALYSIS: The court explained that courts have approved the 
creation of cy pres funds in class actions “to be used for a charitable 
purpose related the class plaintiffs’ injury, when it is difficult for all class 
members to receive individual shares of the recovery and, as a result, 
some or all of the recovery remains.” Id. The court stated that courts 
have approved cy pres funds “when it is economically infeasible to 
distribute money to class members,” and “when money remained from 
the defendant’s payout after money for damages had been distributed to 
class members.” Id. The court explained that as a solution to unclaimed 
payout, courts have approved giving money to “charities related to the 
plaintiffs’ injuries.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that settlement agreements in 
class actions may establish cy pres funds. Id. 
 
QUESTION TWO: Whether incorporating by reference prior class 
certification orders, instead of explaining and justifying a certification 
decision for an expanded class, satisfies F. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B). Id. at 
38. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that rule 23(c)(1)(B) “explains the 
contents of a certification order: the order must clarify and detail the 
identity of a class and the class claims, issues, or defenses in a class 
action.” Id. at 39. The court further noted that rules 23(c)(1)(A) and (C) 
“contemplate district courts issuing an order certifying a class and 
detailing the class composition and the case’s issues and claims, an order 
the court can amend before final judgment.” Id. The court indicated that 
while Rule 23(c)(1) “does not explain whether 23(c)(1)(B)’s substantive 
requirements apply to amended orders issued under 23(c)(1)(C), . . . 
23(c)(1)(B)’s text appears to apply to any order certifying a class, 
including orders certifying an amended class.” Id. (emphasis added). The 
court reasoned that “[t]he depth of explanation courts should provide in 
amended certification orders depends on the circumstances,” especially 
in light of the 2003 amendments to Rule 23(c)(1) that “put greater 
emphasis on understanding and articulating the ‘contours’ of the class 
action throughout the litigation.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that a “court could incorporate 
its prior orders by reference when certifying the expanded class.” Id. at 
40. 
 
United States v. Dyer, 589 F.3d 520 (1st Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION:  Whether there is intent to traffic child pornography 
under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4(c)(2) when the petitioner downloaded files into a 
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shared folder that he knew would be made available to others, and 
although he knew how to turn off the sharing feature of the site, he chose 
not to do so. Id. at 524. 
ANALYSIS:  The court began by examining the meaning of “traffic” 
under § 2G2.4(c)(2), determining that a defendant traffics in child 
pornography if he engaged or intended to engage in an exchange or trade 
of such images. Id. at 526. The court found that no monetary gain or 
expectation of monetary gain is necessary. Id. The court then looked at 
the meaning of “intent”. Id. at 528. Based on the text, legislative history, 
and precedent, the court found that specific intent is not needed. Id. at 
529. 
CONCLUSION:  The 1st Circuit held that there was intent to traffic 
in child pornography where the petitioner downloaded child pornography 
into shared folder and allowed access to that folder by other people even 
though he was capable of preventing access to the pornographic images. 
Id. at 531. 
 
United States ex rel. Ondis v. Woonsocket, 587 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: “Whether a response to a [Freedom Of Information Act 
(FOIA)] request constitutes a public disclosure within the purview of the 
[False Claims Act (FCA)].” Id. at 55. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “the ‘public disclosure’ 
requirement is satisfied when there is some act of disclosure to the public 
outside of the government.” Id. The court noted that “[r]esponding to a 
FOIA request constitutes such an act.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held “that a response to a FOIA 
request is an act of public disclosure” within the purview of the FCA 
“because the response disseminates (and, thus, discloses) information to 
members of the public.” Id. at 55. 
 
United States v. Santiago-Rivera, 594 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: To what extent “a federal judge may shape a sentence 
for a violation of supervised release to affect an unrelated state 
sentence.” Id. at 83. 
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit addressed what types of impermissible 
sentencing factors have been erroneously used by district courts when 
sentencing a defendant upon revocation of supervised released. Id. at 85. 
The court viewed an 11th Circuit holding that vacated a sentence “on the 
ground that the district court was motivated to lengthen the sentence by 
its disapproval of the fact that an immigration judge had released 
[Defendant] on bond pending his appeal,” as instructive on the matter. Id. 
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The 1st Circuit also noted that appellate courts have vacated sentences 
when “a district court stumbles over the concept of ‘disparity.’” Id. That 
is, courts have found procedural error in instances of a district court’s 
consideration of the disparity between federal sentences and local 
sentences for similar offenses. Id. at 85–86. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit concluded that although a district 
court may consider the “disparity between federal and state sentences,” it 
may not go so far as to explicitly fashion of a federal sentence “in order 
to influence the manner in which a sentence imposed by a local court 
was implemented.” Id. at 86. 
 
Chiang v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 595 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “Whether § 1681s-2(b) of the [Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (FCRA)] provides for a private right of action and the standards for 
asserting a claim under that section.” Id. at 29. 
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit adopted a “plain meaning” canon of 
statutory interpretation and found that a private cause of action does exist 
for individuals seeking remedies for furnishers’ violations under § 
1681s-2(b). Id. at 36. The court also evaluated the extent of a furnisher’s 
investigation obligation under the statute. Id. at 37. The court agreed with 
the 4th Circuit’s observation that “it would make little sense to conclude 
that Congress used the term ‘investigation’ to include superficial, un 
reasonable [sic] inquiries by creditors.” Id. Accordingly, the court found 
that the term “investigation” should be interpreted in a way that gives 
furnishers under § 1681s-2(b) flexibility in their investigatory obligation. 
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit recognized that “under § 1681s-2(b) 
there is a private cause of action, that the investigation must be 
reasonable, that [the] test is objective, and that plaintiff bears the burden 
of proof.” Id. at 30. The court also held that “a § 1681s-2(b) claim 
requires plaintiff to show actual inaccuracies that a furnisher’s 
objectively reasonable investigation would have been able to discover.” 
Id. 
 
PowerShare, Inc. v. Syntel, 597 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether a district judge should apply a “clearly 
erroneous or contrary to law” or a “de novo” standard when “reviewing a 
magistrate judge’s disposition of a motion to stay litigation pending the 
completion of a parallel arbitration proceeding.” Id. at 12. 
ANALYSIS: The court pointed out that while the Federal 
Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), “confers authority upon district 
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judges to designate magistrate judges to hear pretrial motions, . . . 
[m]agistrate judges serve as aides to, and under the supervision of, 
district judges. . . .” Id. at 13. The court explained that as Article I 
judicial officers, magistrate judges “ordinarily may not decide motions 
that are dispositive either of a case or of a claim or defense within a case 
. . . because the Constitution requires that Article III judges exercise final 
decisionmaking authority.” Id. (footnote omitted). The court stated that 
under FED. R. CIV. P. 72, “[w]hen a magistrate judge decides a non-
dispositive motion, the district judge may, given a timely appeal, set 
aside the order if it is ‘clearly erroneous or is contrary to law,’” but 
“when a magistrate judge passes upon a dispositive motion, he or she 
may only issue a recommended decision, and if there is a timely 
objection, the district judge must engage in de novo review.” Id. at 14. 
The court noted that a motion to stay litigation is “not among the motions 
enumerated in [the Federal Magistrates Act],” nor “of the same 
character.” Id. Nevertheless, the court stated that a “federal court’s ruling 
on a motion to stay litigation pending arbitration is not dispositive of 
either the case or any claim or defense within it,” and “[a]lthough 
granting or denying a stay may be an important step in the life of a case . 
. . a stay order is merely suspensory.” Id. In addition, the court explained 
that “[e]ven if such a motion is granted, the court still retains authority to 
dissolve the stay or, after the arbitration has run its course, to make 
orders with respect to the arbitral award.” Id. The court also pointed out 
that because the narrow scope of judicial review of arbitral awards does 
not extinguish the possibility of such review,” there “is no final exercise 
of Article III power at the time the court acts on the motion to stay.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “from a procedural 
standpoint,” district judges would comport with Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 in 
employing a “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard when 
reviewing a magistrate judge’s denial of a motion to stay litigation. Id. 
 
Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436 (1st Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether a “securities professional can be said to 
‘make’ a statement, such that liability under 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5(b) 
may attach, either by (i) using statements to sell securities, regardless of 
whether those statements were crafted entirely by others, or (ii) directing 
the offering and sale of securities on behalf of an underwriter, thus 
making an implied statement that he has a reasonable basis to believe 
that the key representations in the relevant prospectus are truthful and 
complete.” Id. at 442. 
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ANALYSIS: The court noted that the inquiry centered on “whether 
the defendants made untrue statements of material fact within the 
meaning of this rule.” Id. The court stated that the “the pivotal word in 
the rule’s text is ‘make,’ as in ‘to make a statement,’” and that the “rule 
itself does not define that word, nor does it suggest that the word is 
imbued with any exotic meaning.” Id. The court declared, “[i]n the 
absence of either a built-in definition or some reliable indicium that the 
drafters intended a special nuance, accepted canons of construction teach 
that the word should be given its ordinary meaning.” Id. The court 
further acknowledged that “the question does not turn on dictionary 
meanings alone.” Id. at 443. The court looked to the “structure of section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as well as other, related provisions, to interpret the 
term at issue,” and found that “Section 10(b) grants the SEC broad 
authority to proscribe conduct that ‘use[s] or employ[s]’ any 
‘manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance,’ in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.” Id at 450 (alterations in original). 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that Rule 10b-5(b) does not 
contemplate an expansive definition of the phrase “to make a statement,” 
noting that “the language and structure of a rule, the statutory framework 
that it implements, and the teachings of the Supreme Court coalesce to 
provide a well-lit decisional path.”  Id. 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
Meijer, Inc. v. Ferring B.V., 585 F.3d 677 (2d Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether plaintiffs have standing as purchasers of a 
patent “to bring [a] Walker Process claim, when a court has yet to find 
the patent [was] fraudulently obtained.” Id. at 690 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that Walker Process “reflects a 
willingness to let antitrust liability impact the patent system.” Id. 
Additionally, the court noted that “the interest in protecting patentees 
from innumerable vexatious suits [cannot] be used to frustrate the 
assertion of rights conferred by the antitrust laws.” Id. at 690–91 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Although the court was reluctant to 
“expand[] the universe of potential patent challengers,” it did not want to 
“ creat[e] the potential to leave a significant antitrust violation undetected 
or unremedied.” Id. at 691 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court 
declined “to decide whether purchaser plaintiffs per se have standing to 
raise Walker Process claims.” Id. Nevertheless, the court held that the 
plaintiffs in the instant case should be granted “antitrust standing without 
altering the typical limits on who can start a challenge to a patent’s 
2010] First Impressions 293 
 
validity” because they were “challenging an already tarnished patent.” 
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held “that purchaser plaintiffs have 
standing to raise Walker Process claims for patents that are already 
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.” Id. at 691–92. 
 
Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715 (2d Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether “an immigration judge [] or the BIA may 
consider the record of a credible fear interview when evaluating an 
alien’s credibility.” Id. at 717. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit found that petitioner’s credible fear 
interview was “conducted in a non-coercive and careful manner” and 
“appropriately documented by the interviewing authorities.” Id. at 725–
26. Thus, the court determined that “petitioner’s credible fear interview, 
like her airport interview, bears sufficient indicia of reliability.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that where “the record of a 
credible fear interview bears sufficient indicia of reliability, it may be 
relied on as a source of an alien’s statement.” Id. at 726. 
 
Pierre v. Holder, 588 F.3d 767 (2d Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether subsection U is a necessarily included 
offense in a charge of removability under [§] 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) [of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1227] as defined by 
subsection M.” Id. at 772. 
ANALYSIS: The court first considered precedent from the Board of 
Immigration Appeals and from its own circuit. Id. at 774. It distinguished 
these cases because they involved situations in which “[a]liens had been 
charged with removability on the basis of their convictions for an 
aggravated felony as defined by both subsections M and U, but because 
their victims did not sustain the requisite amount of actual loss under 
subsection M, the cases proceeded under subsection U, not M.” Id. at 
775. The court finally stated that the subsections under question could 
not be compared to Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure because a “removal proceeding is civil, not criminal,” and 
Congress did not provide for such a statutory scheme for the statute at 
issue. Id. at 776–77. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “[t]he Government’s 
charge that an alien is removable on the basis of a conviction for an 
aggravated felony as defined by subsection M does not necessarily 
include a charge of removability for an aggravated felony as defined by 
subsection U.” Id. at 772. 
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Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 
(2d Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether the Pinkerton doctrine applies to an 
international law conspiracy claim under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). 
Id. at 260. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “the only [inchoate] conspiracy 
crimes that have been recognized by international war crimes tribunals . . 
. are conspiracy to commit genocide and common plan to wage 
aggressive war.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “plaintiffs have not 
established that international law [universally] recognize[s] a doctrine of 
conspiratorial liability that would extend to activity encompassed by the 
Pinkerton doctrine.” Id. 
 
Sacirbey v. Guccione, 589 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether “an arrest warrant issued by a foreign court 
[in Bosnia] that no longer has jurisdiction over the accused, nor the 
power to enforce the warrant, can provide an adequate basis for the 
extradition of a United States citizen.” Id. at 54. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 7th, 8th and 9th Circuits have 
“determined that, where an extradition treaty does not condition 
extradition on the filing of formal charges, [they] would not read such a 
requirement into the treaty.” Id. at 64. The court went on to add that 
whether “extradition treaties should contain provisions ensuring that a 
judicial body in the requesting country stand ready to ensure procedural 
regularity upon the transfer of custody” is a question “for the executive 
branch to decide.” Id. at 65–66 (emphasis in original). The court thus 
focused on the question of “whether the offense charged is extraditable 
under the relevant [U.S.–Bosnia extradition] treaty.’” Id. at 66. The court 
noted that the treaty requires that an individual sought for extradition 
must have been charged with a crime. Id. at 67. The court read the 
treaty’s provisions to mean that “the proof required . . . to establish that 
an individual has been ‘charged’ with a crime is a valid arrest warrant 
and the evidence submitted in order to obtain that warrant.” Id. The court 
reasoned that because “[t]he arrest warrant for [the petitioner] was never 
re-issued – or otherwise ratified – by a Bosnian court with jurisdiction 
over [the] case . . . the existence of this arrest warrant . . . cannot satisfy 
the Treaty’s requirement that Bosnia demonstrate a ‘charge’ by 
producing a valid arrest warrant.” Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that an arrest warrant issued by 
a Bosnian court that no longer has jurisdiction over the accused, nor the 
power to enforce the warrant, is not an adequate basis for the extradition 
of a United States citizen. Id. at 69. 
 
United States v. Byors, 586 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether a sentencing enhancement is appropriate 
“where a defendant has obstructed the investigation or prosecution of an 
underlying offense but has not obstructed the investigation or prosecution 
of a subsequent money laundering offense.” Id. at 224 (emphasis in 
original). 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit noted that the obstruction of justice 
guideline set forth in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 
“contains two elements: (1) a temporal element, which requires the 
obstruction to occur during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing 
of the offense of conviction and (2) a nexus element, which requires that 
the obstructive conduct relate to the offense of conviction.” Id. at 227. 
The court held that the first element was met because “defendant’s 
obstructive conduct occurred during the government’s investigation into 
the money laundering offense.” Id. Furthermore, the court determined 
that the second element was satisfied because defendant’s witness 
tampering “relate[s] to fraud, which is relevant conduct or at least an 
offense that is closely related to the money laundering offense.” Id. at 
228. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit concluded “that Application Note 
2(C) to section 2S1.1 of the Guidelines does not preclude an 
enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to section 3C1.1 of the 
Guidelines where a defendant’s obstruction relates to an offense 
underlying a money laundering offense but not to the money laundering 
offense itself.” Id. at 224. 
 
United States v. Hasan, 586 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: “Whether the statute prohibiting making false 
statements on a passport application, 18 U.S.C. § 1542, contains a 
materiality requirement.” Id. at 166. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that when interpreting a statute, the 
starting point is the “text of that statute.” Id.  The court, looking at the 
plain language of the statute, found “[u]nlike other statutes involving 
false statements, § 1542 does not contain a materiality requirement.” Id. 
at 167. 
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CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “the statute plainly does 
not require that the false statement be material.” Id. 
 
United States v. Hester, 589 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether “prosecution for failure to register as a sex 
offender under [the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(SORNA),] . . . violate[s] [the] constitutional right to due process of law” 
where defendant has no actual knowledge of the registration requirement. 
Id. at 90. 
ANALYSIS: The court first explained that “[i]t is well-established 
that ignorance of the law is not a valid defense to a criminal 
prosecution.” Id. at 91. However, “the Supreme Court [in Lambert v. 
California] carved out a narrow exception to this rule, . . . stating: 
‘[e]ngrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice. 
Notice is sometimes essential so that the citizen has a chance to defend 
charges.’” Id. However, the court noted that, with regard to the statute at 
issue in Lambert, the Supreme Court took special notice of the absence 
of “circumstances which might move one to inquire as to the necessity of 
registration.” Id. at 92. In the instant case, defendant had signed the New 
York Sex Offender Registration form, which informed him of the need to 
register whenever he changed addresses. Id. at 93. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “prosecution for failure to 
register as a sex offender under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) does not violate the 
right to due process of law.” Id. at 88. 
 
Wilner v. NSA, 592 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION ONE: “Whether, as a general matter, [] agencies may 
invoke the Glomar doctrine . . . .” Id. at 64. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Glomar doctrine, which says 
“that an agency may, pursuant to FOIA’s statutory exemptions, refuse to 
confirm or deny the existence of certain records in response to a FOIA 
request,” has been upheld in the 1st, 7th, 9th, and D.C. Circuits. Id. at 68. 
The court noted that its sister circuits have held that in order to invoke 
the Glomar doctrine, “an agency must ‘tether’ its refusal to respond . . . 
to one of the nine FOIA exemptions” and that “[i]n evaluating an 
agency’s Glomar response, a court must accord ‘substantial weight’ to 
the agency’s affidavits, ‘provided [that] the justifications for 
nondisclosure are not controverted by contrary evidence in the record or 
by evidence of . . . bad faith.” Id. at 68. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit joined their sister circuits in 
holding that “an agency may refuse to confirm or deny the existence of 
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records where to answer the FOIA inquiry would cause harm cognizable 
under a FOIA exception[.]” Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
QUESTION TWO: Whether, in particular, “the [National Security 
Agency (NSA)] may invoke the Glomar doctrine in response to a 
[Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA)] request for records obtained 
under the Terrorist Surveillance Program.” Id. at 64. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the NSA’s response to the 
request for information was properly tethered to FOIA Exemption 3, 
which “applies to records specifically exempted from disclosure by 
statute,” because “acknowledging the existence or nonexistence of the 
[requested] information . . . would reveal the NSA’s organization, 
functions, and activities, in contravention of . . . the National Security 
Act of 1959.” Id. at 71–72 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court 
also gave substantial weight to the NSA’s affidavits, as there was no 
“evidence that the NSA invoked the Glomar doctrine in order to conceal 
illegal or unconstitutional activities,” nor did the court “have reason to 
believe that the NSA was acting in bad faith in providing a Glomar 
response.” Id. at 77. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the NSA properly invoked 
the Glomar doctrine in refusing to disclose records obtained under the 
Terrorist Surveillance Program. Id. at 77. 
 
Zhang v. Holder, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 22699 (2d Cir. Oct. 16, 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
“erred in rejecting [plaintiff’s] attempts to invoke the state-created 
danger doctrine as a basis for relief” after her application for asylum, 
request for withholding of removal, and request for relief under the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT) were denied. Id. at *1, *3 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that plaintiff’s argument that the BIA 
should have invoked the state-created danger doctrine as a basis for relief 
raised an issue of first impression in the 2nd Circuit.  Id. at *3. The court, 
however, saw “no reason to disagree with the BIA’s conclusion, which 
relies on cases holding that the state-created danger doctrine does not 
apply in immigration proceedings.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that it “will not disturb the 
BIA’s conclusion” regarding the inapplicability of the state-created 
danger doctrine to immigration proceedings. Id. 
 
Ascencio-Rodriguez v. Holder, 595 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2010) 
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QUESTION ONE: “Whether a conviction for illegal entry is a 
formal, documented process pursuant to which an alien is determined to 
be inadmissible [under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)].” Id. at 107 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS: The court acknowledged “the statute under which 
[appellant] was convicted, 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) . . . makes no reference 
to admissibility,” but pointed out that “its language almost mirrors the 
definition of inadmissibility contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).” 
Id. at 113 (emphasis in original). “Accordingly, his conviction following 
his plea of guilty constituted an admission to facts that rendered him 
inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).” 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “the decisions of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals are reasonable interpretations of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b and entitled to Chevron deference[.]” Id. at 115. 
 
QUESTION TWO: If such conviction does satisfy 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(b), “whether such a process interrupts an alien’s continuous 
physical presence in the United States” for the purpose of that statute. Id. 
at 107. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “the [Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ (BIA)] interpretation of the cancellation removal statute . . . is 
reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference.” Id. at 112. Accordingly, 
the court adopted the BIA’s holding that “it would be contrary to the 
overall objectives of the [Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996] to allow an alien to continue to accrue time 
for purposes of obtaining relief after the alien departs under a formal 
order of deportation or removal, or under the threat of such an order.” Id. 
at 111 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “petitioner’s conviction 
for illegal entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) constituted a 
formal, documented process which . . . terminated his continuous 
physical presence in the United States within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(b)(1).” Id. at 115 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Reiseck v. Universal Communs. of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 
2010) 
QUESTION: “Whether advertising salespersons are administrative 
employees for the purposes of the exemptions to the FLSA’s overtime 
pay provisions . . . .” Id. at 106.  
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that where an employee earns more 
than $250 per week, the “short test” applies. Id. at 105. The court further 
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noted that under the “short test,” an employee falls under the exemption 
if the employee’s “primary duty consists of . . . the performance of office 
or nonmanual work directly related to management policies or general 
business operations of his employer . . . and requires the exercise of 
discretion and independent judgment.”  Id. Furthermore, the court noted 
that the “Department of Labor describes ‘directly related to management 
policies or general business operations’ in several ways . . . [f]irst, the 
interpretive rules state that the phrase at issue ‘describes those types 
activities relating to the administrative operations of a business as 
distinguished from ‘production’ or, in a retail or service establishment, 
‘sales work’ . . . [t]hey also state that ‘the phrase limits the exemption to 
persons who perform work of substantial importance to the management 
or operation of the business.’” Id. at 106. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that because “[an advertising 
salesperson’s] primary duty [is] the sale of advertising space, [he or she] 
is properly considered a ‘salesperson’ for the purposes of the FLSA and 
therefore does not fall under the administrative exemption to the 
overtime pay provisions of the FLSA.” Id. at 107. 
 
Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether the First Amendment protects statements 
made by a “public employee act[ing] as an ‘employee,’ and not as a 
‘citizen,’ when he notifies his supervisors, either formally or informally, 
of an issue regarding the safety of his workplace that touches upon a 
matter of public concern, as well as on the employee’s own private 
interests.” Id. at 200. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted a Supreme Court decision which 
held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their 
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 201. The court next 
determined whether speech that is not specifically required by a public 
employee’s job duties is also insulated from Constitutional attack. Id. at 
202. In light the Supreme Court decision, the court reasoned that “speech 
made ‘pursuant to’ a public employee’s job duties as ‘speech that owes 
its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities.’” Id. at 
201. Further, the court noted that the phrase “pursuant to” a government 
employee’s official duties should not be construed too narrowly. Id. at 
202. Finally, the court noted that “other circuit courts have concluded 
that speech that government employers have not expressly required may 
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still be ‘pursuant to official duties,’ so long as the speech is in 
furtherance of such duties.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “speech can be ‘pursuant 
to’ a public employee’s official job duties even though it is not required 
by, or included in, the employee’s job description, or in response to a 
request by the employer” and such speech is not protected under the First 
Amendment. Id. at 203. 
 
United States v. Walker, 595 F.3d 441 (2d Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether, in deciding the “proper Sentencing 
Guidelines treatment of prior convictions for state common law crimes, . 
. . the modified categorical approach applicable in [the 2nd] Circuit to 
prior convictions for statutory offenses also applies to prior convictions 
for state common law crimes.” Id. at 442. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that a two-step “modified 
categorical approach” has been established to determine “[w]hether a 
prior conviction following a guilty plea to a statutory offense is a 
qualifying predicate for a Guidelines enhancement.” Id. The court 
acknowledged that the approach, by its terms, applied to statutory 
offenses; however, nothing suggested that “the analysis is different with 
respect to common law crimes, nor is there any reason in principle that it 
should be.” Id. at 444. The court also noted that “criminal statutes often 
incorporate elements of common law offenses, and in these 
circumstances, [it has] looked to the common law to determine whether 
the prior conviction was a qualifying predicate offense.” Id. Finally, the 
court agreed with the 9th Circuit, which held that “when a ‘state crime is 
defined by specific and identifiable common law elements, rather than by 
a specific statute, the common law definition of a crime serves as a 
functional equivalent of a statutory definition.’” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “the modified categorical 
approach applicable in this circuit to prior convictions for statutory 
offenses also applies to prior convictions for state common law crimes.” 
Id. at 442. 
 
United States v. Culbertson, 598 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant can pursue an interlocutory 
appeal of the trial court’s denial of motion seeking new counsel and 
denial of motion requesting a psychiatric examination. Id. at 41. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit discussed “the rule of finality 
embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1291,” noting that there are certain exceptions 
to this rule where “discretionary jurisdiction is conferred upon courts of 
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appeals, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), to consider interlocutory orders 
where the district judge is ‘of the opinion that such order involves a 
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for 
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.’” Id. at 45. 
The court acknowledged that “the ‘collateral order doctrine’ was 
established to permit appeals from a limited class of orders ‘which 
finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights 
asserted in the action,’ and ‘too important’ and ‘too independent’ of the 
cause of action to require entry of final judgment as a pre-condition.” Id. 
The court found that “while the order [denying the appointment of new 
counsel] (1) does conclusively determine a disputed question and (2) 
resolves an issue completely separate from the merits of the prosecution, 
it is not (3) effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” 
Id. at 49. The court stated, “the claimed right to counsel here does not 
implicate . . . a right not to be tried on account of a violation of a 
constitutional or statutory protection.” Id.  Additionally, the court 
declared that it has never “directly determined that . . . an order denying 
a psychiatric examination is immediately appealable, although we have 
alluded to that question in dictum.” Id.  The court found that a ruling that 
the defendant is competent and must proceed to trial “could be 
effectively reviewed and remedied, if erroneous, on appeal from any 
final judgment . . .” Id. at 50. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “an order denying the 
appointment of counsel does not fit within the collateral order doctrine so 
as to permit an interlocutory appeal.” Id. at 49. Further, the 2nd Circuit 
held that “denial of a psychiatric examination, which is in effect a 
holding that [the defendant] is competent to stand trial and must proceed 
to trial, is not immediately appealable.” Id. at 50. 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
P.P. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727 (3d Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: “Whether the [Individuals with Disabilities in 
Education Act (IDEA)] two-year statute of limitations should apply to 
parallel claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” Id. at 735. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “the IDEA and § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act do similar statutory work.” Id. Recognizing that 
similarities between two statutes is generally insufficient to borrow a 
statute of limitation, the court stressed “that there are few federal statutes 
as closely related, and under which such similar claims may be brought, 
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as the IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” Id. at 735–36. Due to 
the close relationship between the IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act, the court reasoned that it would “not make sense that the virtually 
identical claims made under these two statutes would be treated 
differently from a statute-of-limitations perspective.” Id. at 736. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held “that the IDEA’s two-year 
statute of limitations applies to claims made for education under § 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act.” Id. at 737. 
 
Sheriff v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 587 F.3d 584 (3d Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether humanitarian asylum should be granted for 
past persecution if one can demonstrate reasons so compelling that such 
a relief was warranted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii). Id. at 588. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by reviewing 8 C.F.R. § 
208(b)(1)(iii), which states, in relevant part, that “an applicant who has 
suffered past persecution and who does not face a reasonable possibility 
of future persecution may be granted asylum if he or she has 
demonstrated ‘compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return 
to that country arising out of the severity of the past persecution’ . . . [or] 
. . . has established ‘that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she 
may suffer other serious harm upon removal to that country[.]” Id. at 
593. The 3rd Circuit looked to the 9th Circuit’s standard which holds that 
“[a]bsent a likelihood of future persecution, asylum is warranted [under 
this subsection] only if [the applicant] demonstrates that in the past he or 
his family has suffered under atrocious forms of persecution.” Id. at 594. 
The court also noted that the 4th and the 7th Circuit had “similarly 
reserved humanitarian asylum based on past persecution for the most 
atrocious abuse.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that humanitarian asylum is 
allowed only “where there are compelling reasons related to the severity 
of the past persecution,” and reasonable possibility of facing serious 
harm upon return to the country. Id. at 595–96. 
 
United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009)  
QUESTION: Whether the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA) 
is unconstitutionally vague such that it has a “chilling effect” on speech 
and violates the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment. Id. at 
151. 
ANALYSIS: The AEPA proscribes “physical disruptions” of animal 
enterprises when there is intent to cause “economic damage.” Id. at 152. 
“The definitions section of the AEPA states that ‘physical disruption’ 
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does not include any lawful disruption that results from lawful public, 
governmental, or animal enterprise employee reaction to the disclosure 
of information about an animal enterprise.” Id. The court noted that “the 
term ‘physical disruption’ has a well-understood, common definition,” 
and “the government must present the trier of fact with evidence that 
establishes that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused had the requisite 
intent to disrupt the functioning of an animal enterprise,” both of which 
led the court to conclude that the statute is not fatally vague. Id. at 153. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that the AEPA is not void for 
vagueness and is not unconstitutional. Id. at 158. 
 
J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether the Tinker standard applies to student Internet 
speech that occurs outside of school and during non-school hours. Id. at 
298. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit first invoked Tinker’s language, noting 
that students and teachers do not necessarily “shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Id. at 
295. However, the court also acknowledged that the Supreme Court has 
“repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive 
authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with 
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct 
in the schools.” Id. at 296. In mediating between these two principles, the 
3rd Circuit declined to specifically decide “whether a school official may 
discipline a student for her lewd, vulgar, or offensive off-campus speech 
that has an effect on-campus” because such a question is properly 
governed by Tinker. Id. at 298. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “Tinker applies to student 
speech, whether on- or off-campus, that causes or threatens to cause a 
substantial disruption of or material interference with school or invades 
the rights of other members of the school community.” Id. at 307–08. 
FOURTH CIRCUIT 
In re Crescent City Estates, LLC, 588 F.3d 822 (4th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) permits the imposition 
of legal fees on an attorney who erroneously removes a case from state to 
federal court.” Id. at 824. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that there is a presumption that 
“[w]hen a fee-shifting statute does not explicitly permit a fee award 
against counsel, it prohibits it” and that such a presumption had not been 
overcome in this case. Id. at 825. The court then reasoned that even 
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though § 1447(c) amends the American rule – “parties bear their own 
legal costs” – to permit fee-shifting from the prevailing party to the 
losing party, the statute’s “[t]ext nor its legislative history is sufficient to 
overcome the American Rule’s presumption that parties rather than 
attorneys are liable for attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 825–26. The court further 
stated that “[t]he Supreme Court and other circuits have interpreted fee-
shifting statutes with text materially indistinguishable from that of § 
1447(c) to be inapplicable to counsel.” Id. at 828. Finally, the court 
concluded that a contrary decision will “generate more collateral 
litigation,” “pit lawyer and client against each other,” “chill the right of 
removal,” and “transform what it means to practice law.” Id. at 829–30. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) does 
not permit the imposition of legal fees upon an attorney who erroneously 
removes a case from state to federal court. Id. at 831. 
 
United States v. Hairston, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 2386 (4th Cir. Feb. 
4, 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “a state [may] retroactively strip a felon of a 
previously restored right to possess firearms,” and if so, whether that act 
“revive[s] a previously negated predicate conviction for purposes of 
applying a sentencing enhancement under sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e)” 
of North Carolina’s Felony Firearms Act (NCFFA). Id at *7–8. 
ANALYSIS: With regard to the first issue, the 4th Circuit recognized 
that constitutional claims under the Ex Post Facto Clause are governed 
by a two-part test. Id. at *7. First, a court must “ask whether the 
legislature’s intent was to impose a punishment or merely enact a civil or 
regulatory law.” Id. at *8. The second step requires a court to “determine 
whether the disability is so punitive in fact as to negate any civil or 
regulatory intent.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court 
looked to persuasive case law in finding the North Carolina statute 
constitutional. Id. 
Assuming a state’s power to retroactively strip a felon of a 
previously restored right to possess firearms, the 4th Circuit next queried 
whether “stripping a restored right to possess firearms effectively revives 
a previously negated predicate conviction” under the NCFFA. Id. at *12. 
The court looked to an analogous Illinois felon in possession law, and 
adopted the 7th Circuit’s logic that past “convictions were once again 
available” for sentencing enhancements one the restored right had been 
stripped. Id. at *13–14. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that a state statute which 
retroactively strips a felon of a previously restored right to possess 
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firearms is constitutional. Id. at *8. The 4th Circuit further concluded that 
such an act also revives previously negated corresponding convictions 
for purposes of sentencing enhancement under the NCFFA. Id. at *14. 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 
In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether a circuit court can grant a writ of mandamus 
directing a district court to reconsider a pretrial multidistrict litigation 
(MDL) decision. Id. at 410. 
ANALYSIS: The court addressed this issue in two parts. Id. First, the 
court adopted the view that “transferor courts should use the law of the 
case doctrine to determine whether to revisit a transferee court’s 
decision.” Id. at 411. Therefore, “a successor judge has the same 
discretion to reconsider an order as would the first judge, but should not 
overrule the earlier judge’s order or judgment merely because the later 
judge might have decided matters differently.” Id. Next, in addressing 
whether it could properly grant mandamus given the procedural posture 
of the case, the court noted that “[t]he law of the case doctrine requires 
that courts not revisit the determinations of an earlier court unless (i) the 
evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different, (ii) controlling 
authority has since made a contrary decision of the law applicable to 
such issues, or (iii) the decision was clearly erroneous and would work . . 
. manifest injustice.” Id. at 412 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Finding a clearly erroneous decision working manifest injustice, the 
court found that the “the transferor court should have reconsidered the 
MDL court’s . . . decision.” Id. at 414. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that it could issue a writ of 
mandamus on a district court’s refusal to reconsider a pretrial MDL 
decision. Id. 
 
Schaefer v. Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc., 591 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: “Whether the Bankruptcy Code requires a Chapter 11 
plan to provide an explicit conversion mechanism between subordinated 
securities claims and equity interests.” Id. at 354. 
ANALYSIS: The court first determined that, in the present case, the 
“interrelation” of the subordinated securities claims and equity interests 
was “contingent and presently knowable.” Id. The court then reasoned 
that a “court’s decision to approve a plan that provides . . . for statutorily 
correct pro rata treatment of [subordinated securities claims] and [equity 
interests], adjudicated in an adversary proceeding if necessary, furnished 
adequate specificity and complied with [the Bankruptcy Code].” Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “[d]espite the uncertainty 
and lack of an articulated ex ante formula . . . there is no impediment to 
confirming a reorganization plan with unsecured claims treated in this 
way.” Id. at 355. 
 
United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (SORNA) violates the constitutional right to be free 
from ex post facto punishment because it requires registration for crimes 
committed before its enactment and imposes sanctions for failing to 
register. Id. at 202–04. 
ANALYSIS: Regarding sanctions, the court noted that, “[o]n its face, 
SORNA does not purport to punish sex offenders for their old crimes; 
instead, the government can only punish sex offenders for currently 
failing to register.” Id. at 203 (emphasis omitted). Regarding the 
registration requirement, the court indicated that the Ex Post Facto 
Clause was violated only if the legislature’s regulatory scheme was 
“punitive” rather than “civil.” Id. at 204. The court found that SORNA’s 
“express language indicates that Congress sought to create a civil 
remedy” and that there was no evidence that Congress intended the 
regulation to be punitive in design or effect. Id. at 205. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that SORNA does not violate 
the constitutional right to be free from ex post facto punishment. Id. at 
206. 
 
Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 592 F.3d 687 
(5th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether insurance companies that “[over]pay [in a pro 
rata insurance claim] defense costs may recoup a portion of those costs 
from a co-insurer that fails to defend a common insured.” Id. at 689. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that the “Texas courts have 
repeatedly affirmed that an insurer’s duty to defend is separate from and 
broader than its duty to indemnify.” Id. at 694. The court found that the 
insurer had a duty to defend based on “uniform holdings of Texas courts 
that if even a single claim in a lawsuit potentially falls within an 
insurance policy’s coverage, the insurer has a duty to provide a complete 
defense.” Id. at 695. The court determined that the plaintiff insurance 
companies made compulsory payments beyond their fair share. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit affirmed the defendant insurance 
company’s duty to defend common insured and that plaintiff-appellants 
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“are entitled to collect a proportionate share of defense costs” from 
defendant. Id. at 696. 
 
Chaney v. Dreyfus Serv. Corp., 595 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether insurance companies are considered bank 
customers in the context of a negligence claim, and thus can be afforded 
protection under state tort law. Id. at 231. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the duties on financial 
organizations depend on whether the claimant is a customer or a third 
party. Id. at 229. Further, the court noted that the imposition of a duty is 
a question of public policy. Id. at 231. The court recognized that “it is 
clearly the fear of imposing on banks endless, unpredictable liability that 
drives [the state’s] distinction between a bank’s customers and non-
customers.” Id. The court posited that there is no risk in imposing duties 
on the insurance companies as customers for three reasons. Id. First, the 
“funds in the accounts were registered to the insurance companies.” Id. 
Second, the “addresses and taxpayer identification numbers utilized in 
opening the accounts made it abundantly clear that the named [insurance 
companies] were separate and distinct [from the holding company].” Id. 
Third, the insurance companies received “monthly statements and 
confirmations of account activity.” Id. Thus, the court determined that 
“imposing the limited duties of care flowing to customers would hardly 
be crippling [to insurance companies]; nor would it ‘unreasonably 
expand’ banks’ ‘orbit of duty.’” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that insurance companies can 
qualify as a customers and “access the protections afforded to that status 
under [state] tort law, if it opens the account itself or has some 
equivalently direct personal relationship with the financial institution.”  
Id. at 232. 
 
Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “Louisiana owes full faith and credit to the 
subject New York adoption decree.” Id. at 703. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the Clause is different from 
res judicata because res judicata is a voluntary restraint by a forum state 
from exercising its power so as to respect the judgment of another state, 
whereas “the Clause is a mandatory, constitutional curb on every state’s 
sovereign power” and “[w]ith respect to judgments (although not to 
statutes), a state as a rule has no discretion to disregard a decision of 
another state on a matter over which that other state is competent to 
exercise jurisdiction.” Id. at 710 (emphasis in original). The court then 
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reasoned that although “[t]here are limited exceptions to the mandate of 
the [Clause] that look behind the judgment to original court 
proceedings,” these exceptions are “inapplicable here and are not 
advanced by the Registrar.” Id. The court noted that “Louisiana owes 
‘exacting’ full faith and credit to the New York adoption decree.”  Id. at 
711. Finally, the court reasoned that the opponent’s proffered argument 
“that adoption decrees are fundamentally different kinds of judgments 
and are not owed full faith and credit” was similar to other arguments 
that “have either been rejected by those courts that have considered them 
or simply reflect a fundamental misapprehension of the law and the 
Constitution.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the Constitution of the United States, Louisiana owes 
full faith and credit to the New York adoption decree. . . .” Id. at 719 
(emphasis omitted). 
SIXTH CIRCUIT 
Longaberger Co. v. Kolt, 586 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel is 
applicable when “a party argues an inconsistent position based on a 
change in controlling law.” Id. at 470–71. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by stating that judicial estoppel is “an 
equitable doctrine that preserves the integrity of the courts by preventing 
a party from abusing the judicial process through cynical gamesmanship, 
achieving success on one position, then arguing the opposite to suit an 
exigency of the moment.” Id. at 470. The court reasoned that judicial 
estoppel “is applied with caution to avoid impinging on the truth-seeking 
function of the court . . . .” Id. The court then noted that the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 
7th and 9th Circuits have held that “judicial estoppel is inappropriate 
when a party is merely changing its position in response to a change in 
the law.” Id. The court also noted that the 10th Circuit has held that 
“judicial estoppel bars changes in factual positions and does not extend 
to inconsistent opinions or legal positions.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit, in adopting the position of its sister 
circuits, held that “judicial estoppel is not applicable where a party 
argues an inconsistent position based on a change in controlling law.” Id. 
 
Memphis Biofuels, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 F.3d 
917 (6th Cir. 2009) 
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QUESTION: Whether “the act of incorporation under Section 17 [of 
25 U.S.C. 477] divests entities of their tribal-sovereign immunity.” Id. at 
920. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that “the statute [25 U.S.C. 477] 
is silent as to whether Section 17 incorporated tribes have sovereign 
immunity.” Id. The court first noted that a tribe’s immunity will remain 
intact “unless Congress abrogates a tribe’s immunity, or the tribe waives 
its immunity.” Id. at 921. Furthermore, Supreme Court precedent 
instructed “that abrogation of tribal-sovereign immunity must be clear 
and may not be implied.” Id. (emphasis in original). The court further 
reasoned that “statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the 
Indians, or [tribes] with ambiguous provisions being interpreted to their 
benefit.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that incorporated tribes “do not 
automatically forfeit tribal-sovereign immunity.” Id. 
 
Mich. Am. Fedn. of State County v. Matrix Human Servs., 589 F.3d 
851 (6th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a defendant who successfully obtains 
dissolution of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction in a 
labor dispute case may recover its damages, fees and costs under section 
seven of the Norris-LaGuardia Act . . . if no bond was ordered prior to 
dissolution of the injunction.” Id. at 853. 
ANALYSIS: The court first asserted that “[i]t is fundamental in our 
civil system that each party to a lawsuit bears its own costs unless a 
statute or agreement provides otherwise.” Id. at 857. Applying this policy 
to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the court found this statute requires a bond 
for recovery. Id. at 858. Next, the court recognized Supreme Court 
precedent that “a party injured by the issuance of an injunction later 
determined to be erroneous has no action for damages in the absence of a 
bond.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held “that section seven of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act allows recovery only in relation to a bond set 
according to the conditions in the act.” Id. 
 
United States v. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether proximate cause is the appropriate standard to 
apply in determining whether a health care fraud violation results in 
death. Id. at 317. 
ANALYSIS: The court considered the 1st Circuit’s holding that 
under 18 U.S.C. § 242, another health care fraud statute, the 
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“[r]equirement for enhanced punishment is met when the defendant’s 
willful violation of the statute is a ‘proximate cause’ of the victim’s 
death. . . .” Id. at 317–18. The court then noted that the 1st Circuit found 
that “[p]roximate cause can be demonstrated where death was the 
‘natural and foreseeable’ result of the defendant’s conduct.” Id. at 318. 
The court further reasoned that “Congress was aware of principles of 
legal causation when it determined that a health care fraud ‘violation 
[that] results in death’ warrants an enhanced penalty.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that “proximate cause is the 
appropriate standard to apply in determining whether a health care fraud 
violation ‘results in death.’” Id. at 318–19. 
 
United States v. Washington, 584 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether the district court has authority to reduce a 
sentence beyond the retroactive United States Sentencing Guidelines as 
amended. Id. at 694. 
ANALYSIS: “A district court may modify a defendant’s sentence 
only as provided by statute.” Id. at 695. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) limits the 
calculation of sentence ranges to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
§ 1B1.10(b)(1). Id. at 696. The new policy statement accompanying § 
3582(c)(2) “provides that the sentencing court may not reduce a sentence 
below the Guidelines range . . . .” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that a district court has no 
authority to reduce defendant’s sentence below the amended Guidelines 
range. Id. at 701. 
 
Asher v. Unarco Material Handling, Inc., 596 F.3d 313 (6th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether Rule 15(c) [of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure] permits relation back of an amendment adding otherwise 
untimely plaintiffs and their claims to a timely-filed complaint.” Id. at 
317. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that circuit precedent “clearly 
holds that an amendment which adds a new party creates a new cause of 
action and there is no relation back to the original filing for purposes of 
limitations.” Id. at 318. Next, the court examined the plain language of 
the statute. Id. The court then reviewed decisions that applied relation-
back provisions of 15(c) in the case of misnomers or misdescriptions. Id. 
Finally, the court noted decisions by the 2nd Circuit and the District of 
Columbia Circuit involving attempts by plaintiffs “to invoke Rule 
15(c)’s relation-back provision under these circumstances.” Id. at 319. 
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CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that Rule 15(c) does not permit 
relation back of an amendment adding otherwise untimely plaintiffs and 
their claims to a timely-filed complaint. Id. at 318. 
 
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, 
597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a teacher at a sectarian school classifies as 
a ministerial employee . . .” under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA). Id. at 778. 
ANALYSIS: The vast majority of other courts to consider the issue 
have held that “parochial school teachers . . . who teach primarily secular 
subjects, do not classify as ministerial employees for purposes of the 
exception.” Id. Teachers who teach primarily religious courses or have a 
“central role in the spiritual or pastoral mission of the church” can be 
classified as ministerial employees. Id. at 779. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that a teacher does not qualify 
as a ministerial employee unless his or her primary function is to teach 
religious courses or play a major part in the spiritual mission of the 
church. Id. at 782. 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
In re Sprint Nextel Corp., 593 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether CAFA requires the plaintiffs to document 
more than general state citizenship of the members of the proposed class 
to satisfy the home state exception requirement and avoid removal to 
federal court. Id. at 671. 
ANALYSIS: The court determined that the citizenship of class 
members cannot merely be based on phone numbers and mailing 
addresses. Id. at 675. Rather, the court noted two ways in which 
citizenship can be plead such that the home state exception would be 
met. Id. First, the plaintiffs can document state citizenship of a sample of 
the population, evidenced by “affidavits or survey responses in which 
putative class members reveal whether they intend to remain in [the 
state] indefinitely” and the court can rely on “statistical principles to 
reach a conclusion as to the likelihood that two-thirds or more of the 
proposed class members are citizens of [the state].” Id. at 676. 
Alternatively, the plaintiffs can define the class as all [state] citizens who 
purchased text messaging from the defendant or an alleged coconspirator 
in order to remain in state court. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that CAFA requires more than 
simply documenting general state citizenship to meet the home state 
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exception requirement allowing the lawsuit to remain in state court. Id. at 
674. 
 
Helcher v. Dearborn County, 595 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: What constitutes an “adequate writing” under the 
Telecommunications Act. Id. at 717. 
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit recognized three varying approaches to 
interpreting the writing requirement of the Telecommunications Act. 
First, the court found that some courts explicitly require that “local 
governments explicate the reasons for their decisions and link their 
conclusions to specific evidence in the record.” Id. at 717–18. By 
contrast, the court also acknowledged the 4th Circuit’s perspective that a 
writing need not include a statement of “findings and conclusion, and the 
reason or basis thereof.” Id. at 718. Finally, the court recognized that the 
1st, 6th, and 9th Circuits have struck a balance “between a dubious, 
literal reading of the Act and a pragmatic, policy-based approach,” 
concluding that the purpose of the “‘in writing’ requirement is to allow 
for meaningful judicial review . . . .” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit joined the 1st, 6th, and 9th Circuits 
in holding that the “‘in writing’ requirement is met so long as the written 
decision contains a sufficient explanation of the reasons for the permit 
denial to allow a reviewing court to evaluate the evidence in the record 
supporting those reasons.” Id. 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
Casey v. FDIC, 583 F.3d 586 (8th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether federal regulation 12 C.F.R. § 560.2, 
promulgated by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), only preempts 
state laws that facially impose requirements upon lenders or if the statute 
also preempts state laws that, as applied, impose requirements on 
lenders. Id. at 593. 
ANALYSIS: The court first examined the 9th Circuit’s as applied 
analysis of two California statutes addressing unfair advertising and 
competition. Id. The 9th Circuit held that even though the statutes did not 
facially place requirements on lending, the statues as applied fell within 
the description of § 560.2(b) and were therefore preempted by the 
regulation. Id. The court then referenced OTS advisory opinions, noting 
that “a state law that on its face is not one described in § 560.2(b) may 
nevertheless be preempted if, as applied, it fits within §560.2(b).” Id. at 
594 (emphasis in original). Finally, the court stated that the OTS’s 
interpretation of its regulation is entitled to deference. Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that “a state law that either on 
its face or as applied imposes requirements regarding the examples listed 
in § 560.2(b) is preempted.” Id. at 595. 
 
Wheeler v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 591 F.3d 355 (8th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether “a plaintiff must prove an adverse effect on 
competition in order to prevail” under § 202 of the Packers and 
Stockyards Act (PSA), 7 U.S.C. § 192. Id. at 357. 
ANALYSIS: The court started by citing to the Supreme Court’s 
observation that the object of the PSA “was to secure the flow of 
livestock from the farms and ranges to the slaughtering center and into 
meat products unburdened by collusion that unduly lowered the prices to 
the shipper and unduly increased the price to the consumer.” Id. at 358. 
The court noted that every circuit that has addressed the issue has held 
that proof of an anticompetitive effect is a necessary factor to prevail 
under the PSA. Id. at 362. The court reasoned that “given the clear 
antitrust context in which the PSA was passed, the placement of [§ 192] 
among other subsections that clearly require anticompetitive intent or 
effect, and the nearly ninety years of circuit precedent, a failure to 
include the likelihood of an anticompetitive effect as a factor actually 
goes against the meaning of the [PSA].” Id. at 363. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that in order to support a claim 
that a practice violates § 192 of the PSA, “there must be proof of injury, 
or likelihood of injury, to competition.” Id. 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
Alvarado v. Cajun Operating Co., 588 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether “compensatory and punitive damages are 
available for [Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)] retaliation 
claims” under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. Id. at 1265. 
ANALYSIS: The court first observed the 7th Circuit’s analysis of the 
issue which held that “[b]ecause the plain language of § 1981a(a)(2) 
limits its application to specific claims, it is inappropriate to expand the 
scope of the statute in reliance on legislative history to include claims for 
retaliation by an employer under the ADA.” The court approved the 7th 
Circuit’s analysis, itself noting that “[t]he text of section 1981a is not 
ambiguous [but rather] explicitly delineates the specific statutes under 
the ADA for which punitive and compensatory damages are available.” 
Id. at 1268. The court subsequently concluded that section 1981a “limits 
its remedial reach to ADA discrimination claims, and does not 
incorporate ADA retaliation claims . . . .” Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit followed the 7th Circuit and held 
that “the plain and unambiguous provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a limit 
the availability of compensatory and punitive damages to those specific 
ADA claims listed.” Id. at 1268–69. 
 
Boose v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist. Of Or., 587 F.3d 997 (9th 
Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether under the American Disabilities Act and 
Rehabilitation Act, the local paratransit program must accommodate the 
plaintiff pursuant to a Department of Justice (DOJ) “regulation requiring 
public entities to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or 
procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination 
on the basis of disability.” Id. at 1000. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by stating that the “Secretary of 
Transportation has the sole authority to issue final regulations to carry 
out [the provision].” Id. at 1001. The court denied plaintiff’s assertion 
that the DOJ’s rules should govern the level of services that the 
paratransit program is required to provide. Id. at 1002. The court further 
stated that the DOJ’s “reasonable modification regulation does not, and 
cannot, apply by its own independent force.” Id. The court refused to 
expand the DOJ’s jurisdiction “beyond the limits established by its 
enabling statute.” Id. at 1003. The court then noted that the Secretary of 
Transportation has “decided that paratransit systems should make 
reasonable modifications to be considered comparable, [although] he has 
yet to issue the final rules that would impose such a requirement.” Id. at 
1005. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that it is outside the DOJ’s scope of 
authority to determine whether the local paratransit program is adequate 
and instead held that it is in the Secretary of Transportation’s “sole 
authority to determine the level of services that paratransit systems must 
provide to be considered comparable.” Id. at 1005. 
 
Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: “Whether or not the functus officio doctrine may be 
applied to an interim award.” Id. at 1003. 
ANALYSIS: The 8th Circuit determined that an interim award may 
be final for functus officio if the award states that it is final, and the 
arbitrator intended it to be final. Id. The court adopted the 8th Circuit’s 
criteria.  Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that when an award is 
expressly made final by the arbitrator is it deemed final for functus 
officio. Id. 
 
Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether an individual’s right of familial association 
under the Fourteenth Amendment attaches when the child does not live 
with the parent. Id. at 733. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted “non-custodial parents have a reduced 
liberty interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of 
their children.” Id. The court acknowledged “interest is unambiguously 
lesser in magnitude than that of a parent with full legal custody.” Id. The 
court found the noncustodial parent had a reduced interest but the parent 
was not without any interest in the custody and management of the child. 
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the right attaches 
“regardless of whether they also possess physical custody of their 
children.” Id. 
 
Cal. Energy Comm’n v. Doe, 585 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether the 9th Circuit, under the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act (EPCA), has jurisdiction to review the U.S. 
Department of Energy’s denial of a preemption waiver. Id. at 1146. 
ANALYSIS: Having denied the California Energy Commission’s 
(CEC) request for a waiver of preemption under the EPCA, the 
Department of Energy challenged the 9th Circuit’s jurisdiction to review 
its decision. Id. The circuit court first held that the denial of the waiver of 
preemption left the CEC “adversely affected by a rule prescribed under 
[42 U.S.C. § 6295] within the meaning of § 6306(b), which confers 
jurisdiction on the circuit courts of appeals.” Id. at 1148. Additionally, 
the court determined that “[c]onsiderations of practicality and 
consistency with the congressional scheme also militate in favor of 
review by the court of appeals.” Id. at 1148–49. Lastly, the court held 
that Department of Energy’s “denial of a waiver of preemption falls into 
the category of [r]ulemaking proceedings [which do not] necessitate 
additional factfinding by a district court to effectuate the review 
process.” Id. at 1149. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that it had proper “jurisdiction 
to entertain CEC’s petition for review.” Id. at 1150. 
 
Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009) 
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QUESTION: Whether a caseworker and deputy sheriff, who were 
“concerned for the well-being of two young girls,” violated the Fourth 
Amendment “when they seized and interrogated a minor in a private 
office at her school for two hours without a warrant, probable cause, or 
parental consent.” Id. at 1015. 
ANALYSIS: The court acknowledged that it has “yet to address the 
principles governing the in-school seizure of a suspected child abuse 
victim.” Id. at 1022. The court stated that it had “previously held that the 
warrantless, non-emergency search and seizure of an alleged victim of 
child sexual abuse at her home violates the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. The 
court declined to differentiate between whether the seizure and 
interrogation took place at home or at school and held that traditional 
“Fourth Amendment protections apply to child abuse investigations.” Id. 
at 1022-23. The court noted that “although the crime of child sexual 
abuse ‘may be heinous . . .[this] does not provide cause for the state to 
ignore the rights of the accused or any other parties.’” Id. at 1023. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit applied the “traditional Fourth 
Amendment requirements, [and held] the decision to seize and 
interrogate [the minor] in the absence of a warrant, a court order, exigent 
circumstances, or parental consent was unconstitutional.” Id. at 1030. 
 
Jeffredo v. Macarro, 590 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: “Whether habeas relief under [§ 1303 of the Indian 
Civil Rights Act, (ICRA)] can be granted in a non-criminal context.” Id. 
at 759. 
ANALYSIS: The court took note of the Supreme Court’s holding 
“that habeas corpus under the ICRA is the exclusive means for federal-
court review of tribal criminal proceedings.” Id. at 760 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that “[t]he [Supreme] 
Court has also found that Congress considered and rejected proposals for 
federal review of alleged violations of the [ICRA] arising in a civil 
context.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court went on to 
explain that “[i]n interpreting § 1303, courts should hesitate to so expand 
the meaning of criminal and detention such that, as a practical matter, all 
tribal decisions affecting individual members in important areas of their 
lives become subject to review in federal court. Such a result would be 
inconsistent with the principle of broad, unreviewable tribal sovereignty 
in all but criminal cases involving physical detention.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “[g]iven the often vast gulf 
between tribal traditions and those with which federal courts are more 
intimately familiar, the judiciary should not rush to create causes of 
2010] First Impressions 317 
 
action that would intrude on these delicate matters.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that habeas relief is not 
available under the ICRA in non-criminal cases. Id. 
 
Parth v. Pomona Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 584 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether “[w]hen an employer changes its shift 
schedule to accommodate its employees’ scheduling desires, the mere 
fact that pay rates changed, between the old and new scheduling schemes 
in an attempt to keep overall pay revenue-neutral . . . establish[es] a 
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (‘FLSA’s’) overtime pay 
requirements.” Id. at 796. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that because this was an issue of first 
impression for the court, it agreed with “the district court’s approach and 
use[d] Supreme Court precedent on pre-FLSA pay plan alterations for 
guidance on how to proceed under the facts . . . .” Id. at 800. The court 
noted that the Supreme Court had previously found that “nothing in the 
[FLSA] bars an employer from contracting with his employees to pay 
them the same wages that they received previously, so long as the new 
rate equals or exceeds the minimum rate required by the FLSA.” Id. 
Further, the court looked “to the purpose of the FLSA, which is to ensure 
that each [covered] employee . . . would receive [a] fair day’s pay for a 
fair day’s work and would be protected from the evil of overwork as well 
as underpay.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court found 
that the employees could not cite any relevant case law to support the 
argument that the employer “cannot respond to its employees’ requests 
for an alternative work schedule by adopting the sought-after schedule 
and paying the employees the same wages they received under the less-
desirable schedule.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit concluded that “the arrangement 
between [the employer and employees] does not violate the FLSA, 
because it is not prohibited under the statute, and it does not contravene 
the FLSA’s purpose.” Id. at 801. 
 
Pedroza v. Benefits Review Bd., 583 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether psychological injuries resulting from 
legitimate personnel actions are compensable under the Longshore and 
Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (Longshore Act). Id. at 1144. 
ANALYSIS: “The Longshore Act provides that ‘[c]ompensation 
shall be payable under this Act in respect to disability . . . of an 
employee, but only if the disability . . . results from an injury.’” Id. at 
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1145. Moreover, “the injury must be work-related.” Id. The court 
observed that “[t]he Act was designed to provide compensation for 
maritime workers who were injured while working on navigable waters 
in the course of their employment.” Id. The court reasoned that extending 
protection to psychological injury from legitimate personnel decisions 
“would create a trap for the ‘unwary’ employer and undermine the 
interest of employers and employees alike.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “psychological injuries 
arising from legitimate personnel actions are not compensable under the 
Longshore Act.” Id. at 1147. 
 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether a ballot initiative advocacy group must 
comply with a government request for production of documents 
including “internal campaign communications relating to campaign 
strategy and advertising,” or if said group has a right of nondisclosure 
under the First Amendment. Id. at 1152. 
ANALYSIS: The party asserting the right of nondisclosure must 
make a prima facie showing “‘that enforcement of the [discovery 
requests] will result in (1) harassment, membership withdrawal, or 
discouragement of new members, or (2) other consequences which 
objectively suggest an impact on, or ‘chilling’ of, the members’ 
associational rights.’” Id. at 1161. The court determined that since 
“compelled disclosure of internal campaign communications” might 
“chill[] participation and . . . mut[e] the internal exchange of ideas,” the 
First Amendment privilege applied. Id. at 1163. With this prima facie 
showing, the burden shifted to the government to “demonstrat[e] an 
interest in obtaining the disclosures it seeks . . . which is sufficient to 
justify the deterrent effect . . . on the free exercise . . . of [the] 
constitutionally protected right of association.” Id. at 1162. The court 
conceded that although “the information [sought] is reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence on the issues 
of voter intent and the existence of a legitimate state interest,” the 
existence of “other sources of information,” meant that the government 
had not “shown a sufficient need for the information.” Id. at 1164. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit concluded that the government’s 
“intrusion on First Amendment interests” of protection from “disclosures 
concerning . . . political associations” are too substantial to survive 
exacting scrutiny. Id. at 1165. 
 
Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2009) 
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QUESTION: Whether a claim that does not seek to challenge the 
Government’s title to real property, but instead seeks tort relief from that 
real property, falls within the Quite Title Act (the “QTA). Id. at 686. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the QTA is invoked when a party 
seeks “to adjudicate a disputed title to real property” of the United States. 
Id. The court recognized that although tort relief from real property of 
the United States is not facially equivalent to a declaration of title 
request, resolution may nonetheless force the court to consider the 
parties’ rights to the real property, triggering the QTA. Id. To solve this 
conflict, the court inquired into the effect of the suit to determine if an 
“actual[] challenge[] [to] the federal government’s title” existed. Id. at 
688. The court then determined that “a suit that does not challenge title 
but instead concerns the use of land as to which title is not disputed can 
sound in tort or contract and not come within the scope of the QTA.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a suit that does not 
“actually challenge[] the federal government’s title, however 
denominated” is beyond the scope of the QTA. Id. 
 
United States v. Aguirre-Ganceda, 592 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether the one-year limitation period for filing a 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside or correct a prison sentence 
runs from the denial of petition for a writ of certiorari or from the denial 
of subsequent petition for rehearing of that denial. Id. at 1045. 
ANALYSIS: The court first reviewed the Supreme Court’s guidance 
in two cases to determine the appropriate definition of ‘finality.’ Id. 
Next, the court noted the decisions of seven other circuits that have 
reached this issue. Id. The court recognized that decisions in other circuit 
courts were based on Supreme Court Rule 16.3, which provides that 
“[w]henever the Court denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, the . . . 
order of denial will not be suspended pending disposition of a petition for 
rehearing except by order of the Court or a Justice.” Id. The court 
determined that its holding is consistent with both the Supreme Court 
guidance and the decisions of the other circuits. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “finality occurs when the 
Supreme Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or 
denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a 
certiorari petition expires.” Id. 
 
United States v. Burkholder, 590 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2010) 
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QUESTION: “Whether the statutory right to be reasonably heard 
under the Crime Victims Rights Act (CVRA) requires the continuing 
attachment of written victim impact statements to a PSR.” Id. at 1074. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that while the CVRA affords victims 
the “right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding,” the statute 
does not define the term “right to be reasonably heard.” Id. The court 
stated that “the term ‘reasonably’ is meant to allow for alternative 
methods of communicating a victim’s views to the court when the victim 
is unable to attend the proceeding.” Id. at 1075. The court further noted 
that “[n]othing in the statute plainly requires appending written victim 
impact statements to a PSR.” Id. at 1074. Furthermore, the court 
reasoned that the legislative history only “suggests that Congress was 
concerned with ensuring that crime victims be allowed to speak at 
proceedings.” Id. at 1075. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “the CVRA provides 
victims the opportunity to communicate directly to the district court; it 
does not specifically require a district court to append a written statement 
to a PSR.” Id. 
 
United States v. Forrester, 592 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION ONE: Whether a defendant can “make a collateral attack 
on a [permanent scheduling order] in a criminal case.” Id. at 978. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 11th Circuit “is the only other 
circuit to have addressed this issue to date.” Id. The court reasoned that 
not only are regulatory decisions “complex matter[s],” but also where the 
agency is not a party, “it has no opportunity to defend its [decision].” Id. 
The court further reasoned that allowing criminal defendants to attack 
such issues would “potentially place a continuing, onerous burden on 
district courts to constantly re-litigate the same issue.” Id. at 979. 
Additionally, the court noted that the fact that “Congress has, at times, 
taken a more proactive stance toward controlling collateral challenges is 
not [persuasive].” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “substantive collateral 
attacks on permanent scheduling orders are impermissible in criminal 
cases where defendants’ sentences will be determined by those 
scheduling orders.” Id. 
 
QUESTION TWO: “Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2518, which mandates 
disclosure of the wiretap application, allows the government to redact 
some information in the application.” Id. at 984. 
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ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 7th Circuit held in a previous 
case that “a defendant does not have a right to redacted portions of a 
wiretap application if the government is able (and willing) to defend the 
warrant without relying on the redacted information.” Id. The 9th Circuit 
further noted that at least two district courts have found the 7th Circuit’s 
holding to be correct. Id. at n.8. Additionally, the court reasoned that in 
some situations, such as protecting informants, “the privilege to withhold 
information . . . is well-established.” Id. at 984. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that where “the unredacted 
parts of the wiretap application [are] more than sufficient to establish 
necessity,” the government may redact some information in the 
application. Id. at 985. 
 
United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the retroactive application of SORNA’s 
[registration and reporting] provision covering individuals who were 
adjudicated juvenile delinquents because of the commission of certain 
sex offenses before SORNA’s passage violates the Ex Post Facto Clause 
of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 927. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[a] statute or regulation that 
imposes retroactive punishment violates the constitutional prohibition on 
the passage of ex post facto laws.” Id. at 930. The court further noted that 
“Congressional intent . . . notwithstanding, we will find an ex post facto 
violation if the effect of SORNA’s juvenile registration provision is 
punitive.” Id. at (emphasis in original). The court reasoned that such a 
determination depends on a variety of factors, including: “the terms of 
the statute, the legal obligations it imposes, the practical and predictable 
consequences of those obligations, our societal experience in general, 
and the application of our own reason and logic, establish conclusively 
that the statute has a punitive effect.” Id. at 931. The court further 
reasoned that the “juvenile registration provision imposes a disability 
that is neither ‘minor’ nor ‘indirect,’ but rather severely damaging to 
former juvenile offenders’ economic, social, psychological, and physical 
well-being.” Id. at 933. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “SORNA’s juvenile 
registration and reporting requirement violates the Ex Post Facto Clause 
of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 942. 
 
Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc., 596 F.3d 577 (9th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether “a restaurant violates the Fair Labor 
Standards Act [(FLSA)], when . . . it requires its wait staff to participate 
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in a ‘tip pool’ that redistributes some of their tips to the kitchen staff.” Id. 
at 578. 
ANALYSIS: The court first observed that “an arrangement to turn 
over or to redistribute tips is presumptively valid.” Id. at 579. The 
plaintiff argued that under 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) “an employee must be 
allowed to retain all of her tips – except in the case of a ‘valid’ tip pool 
involving only customarily tipped employees – regardless of whether her 
employer claims a tip credit.” Id. at 580. The court analyzed 29 U.S.C. § 
203(m) and concluded that “the plain text . . . imposes conditions on 
taking a tip credit and does not state freestanding requirements pertaining 
to all tipped employees.” Id. at 581 (emphasis in original). The court also 
found that the FLSA “does not restrict tip pooling when no tip credit is 
taken” and concluded that the employee’s “contributions to the pool did 
not, and could not, reduce her wages below the statutory minimum.” Id. 
at 582. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit concluded that because “nothing in 
the text of the FLSA purports to restrict employee tip-pooling 
arrangements when no tip credit is taken, [it could] perceive no statutory 
impediment to [the restaurant’s] practice.” Id. at 583. 
 
Martinez v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 598 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 
2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a mortgage lender or other settlement 
service provider violates [the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(RESPA),] by charging ‘excessive’ fees for a settlement service it 
provided.” Id. at 554. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit found that of the three other circuit 
courts to consider the issue, all three have found that excessive fees for 
services actually provided are not in violation of RESPA. Id. Section 
8(b) of RESPA authorizes charges for “services actually performed.” Id. 
at 553. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit joined its sister circuits, holding that 
“Section 8(b) is unambiguous and does not extend to overcharges” for 
services actually provided. Id. at 554. 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
City of Colo. Springs v. Climax Molybdenum, 587 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 
2009) 
QUESTION: Whether a “proposed intervenor may establish 
standing, and thus federal court jurisdiction over its motion to intervene, 
by ‘piggybacking’ on the standing of an existing party to a lawsuit over 
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which the district court has retained jurisdiction but within which there is 
no current, active dispute among the parties.”  Id. at 1073. 
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit turned to 11th and 7th Circuits for 
guidance in addressing this first impression issue. Id. at 1080–81. First, 
the court conveyed its agreement with the 11th Circuit’s holding that a 
prospective intervenor “may piggyback upon the standing of a existing 
party to a case, provided that there is ‘a justiciable case or controversy at 
the point at which intervention is sought.’” Id. at 1081.  The court also 
agreed with 11th Circuit’s limitation that “[i]ntervenors must show 
independent standing to continue a suit if the original parties on whose 
behalf intervention was sought settle or otherwise do not remain adverse 
parties in the litigation.” Id. The court then stated that since a justiciable 
case or controversy is necessary when intervention is sought, “[n]either 
the mere existence of a consent decree nor the continuation of the district 
court’s jurisdiction for enforcement purposes is enough to support 
piggyback standing absent an existing dispute between the original 
parties.” Id. Finally, the court looked to the 7th Circuit’s rationale that a 
“case or controversy must be present at every moment of the litigation,” 
and held that “mere retained jurisdiction over a case does not create a 
perpetual case or controversy, even for the original parties to the case.” 
Id. at 1081. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit concluded that “within litigation 
over which a district court has retained jurisdiction after entering a final 
decree, a proposed intervenor may not establish piggyback standing 
where the existing parties in the suit are not seeking judicial resolution of 
an active dispute among themselves.” Id. at 1081. 
 
Merryfield v. Jordan, 584 F.3d 923 (10th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether an individual committed under the Kansas 
Sexually Violent Predator Act (KSVPA) is required to pay the in forma 
pauperis fee of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA). Id. at 926. 
ANALYSIS: The court examined the definition of “prisoner” 
contained in the PLRA, which specifies that a prisoner is “any person 
incarcerated or detained . . . who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced 
for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms 
and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary 
program.” Id. at 927 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court 
recognized that an individual committed under the KSVPA is detained 
because he or she “poses a threat of future danger due to a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder.” Id. The court noted that other 
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circuits have “unanimously concluded that individuals who are civilly 
committed are not ‘prisoners’ within the meaning of the PLRA.” Id. The 
court also referenced the Supreme Court’s conclusion that a commitment 
under the KSVPA is a process “civil in nature,” and not criminal. Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that the “fee payment 
provisions of § 1915 applicable to a ‘prisoner,’ as defined by § 1915(h), 
do not apply to those civilly committed under the KSVPA.” Id. 
 
Rasenack v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether the proper standard of review of an insurance 
plan administrator’s decision is arbitrary and capricious rather than de 
novo. Id. at 1315. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “ERISA authorizes a judicial 
action challenging an administrative denial of benefits but does not 
specify the standard of review that courts should apply.” Id. at 1315. The 
court adhered to the Supreme Court’s holding that “a denial of benefits 
challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) [ERISA] is to be reviewed under a de 
novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary 
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe 
the terms of the plan.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court 
determined that “[u]nder trust principles, a deferential standard of review 
is appropriate when trustees actually exercise a discretionary power 
vested in them by the instrument under which they act.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). However, the court found that the 
administrator’s failure to timely issue a final decision meant “the 
remedies were deemed exhausted by operation of law rather than the 
exercise of administrative discretion.” Id. at 1316. Accordingly, because 
the administrative body did not actually exercise its discretion, a 
deferential review of the administrative decision was inappropriate. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that the correct standard of 
review of administrative decisions is de novo. Id. at 1318. 
 
United States v. Caldwell, 585 F.3d 1347 (10th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a defendant’s criminal history category can 
be increased for committing an offense while serving under a ‘criminal 
justice sentence’ where the probationary term he was serving at the time 
of the offense only later qualified as a ‘criminal justice sentence’ due to 
events that took place after the defendant committed the offense of 
conviction.” Id. at 1354. 
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ANALYSIS: The court looked to the plain language of the 
sentencing statute for the meaning of “under any criminal justice 
sentence.”  Id. at 1355. The Court found that when a defendant is not 
“under” a “criminal justice sentence” at the time he committed any of the 
conduct leading to conviction, his criminal history category cannot be 
increased. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that a defendant’s criminal history 
category cannot be increased for committing an offense while serving 
under a criminal justice sentence where the probationary term he was 
serving later qualified as a criminal justice sentence due to events 
subsequent to defendant’s commission of the conviction offense. Id. 
 
United States v. Caldwell, 589 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION:  Whether the “mere introduction of a common supplier, 
made by one drug dealer to another, [is] sufficient to create a single 
conspiracy among all the dealers[.]” Id. at 1331. 
ANALYSIS:  The court began by looking at the type of evidence 
needed to uphold a conspiracy conviction. Id. The 10th Circuit noted that 
more than a casual relationship must be shown by looking at the 
circumstances of the case. Id. at 1331–32. The court found that although 
the petitioner had introduced the common supplier to another drug 
dealer, the interaction between the three people was friendly rather than 
aimed towards a conspiracy. Id. at 1332. The 10th Circuit also found it 
significant that the petitioner did not receive an economic benefit from 
the introduction, and was not involved in any drug transaction between 
the common supplier and the other drug dealer. Id. 
CONCLUSION:  The introduction of the common supplier, made by 
one drug dealer to another drug dealer, cannot alone demonstrate beyond 
a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed between the three people. Id. 
 
United States v. Cobb, 584 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether a district court has authority to decrease a 
defendant’s sentence under the criminal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(2), when the sentence is based on a qualifying sentencing range 
as the statute requires. Id. at 982. 
ANALYSIS: A “court can only modify a term of imprisonment upon 
a defendant’s motion where the defendant has been sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment ‘based on a sentencing range lowered by the Sentencing 
Commission.’” Id. (internal citation omitted). Defendant’s sentencing 
disposition and the Fed. R. Crim. Proc. R. 11 agreement all centered on 
the lowered sentencing range. Id. at 983. The court noted that “nothing in 
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the language of § 3582(c)(2) or in the language of Rule 11 precludes a 
defendant who pleads guilty under Rule 11 from later benefitting from a 
favorable retroactive guideline amendment.” Id. at 984. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that the district court has 
authority to reduce sentences imposed under Rule 11 plea agreements 
where the sentence was based at least in part on the applicable sentencing 
range. Id. at 985. 
 
United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972 (10th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
implicitly “waives attorney-client privilege with respect to 
communications with his attorney necessary to prove or disprove his 
claim.” Id. at 978. 
ANALYSIS: When a client puts the privileged communications 
between him and his counsel at issue, the claim cannot be assessed 
without revelation of privileged communications. Id. at 977. When 
counsel’s advice is put at issue by the client, the attorney-client privilege 
is impliedly waived. Id. The court then noted that the 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 
and 11th Circuits have all recognized this principle. Id. at 978. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that “when a habeas petitioner 
claims ineffective assistance of counsel, he impliedly waives attorney-
client privilege with respect to communications with his attorney 
necessary to prove or disprove his claim.” Id. 
 
Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether Wyoming would extend its informed 
consent law to misrepresentations that are physician-specific in nature 
and made in direct response to a patient’s questions.” Id. at 1255. 
ANALYSIS: The court reviewed numerous cases that concluded 
“physician-specific information such as experience is relevant to the 
informed consent issue and physicians have a duty to voluntarily disclose 
such information prior to obtaining a patient’s consent.” Id. The court 
reviewed a split of authority between state courts regarding whether a 
physician has “a duty to truthfully answer [patient’s] physician-specific 
questions.” Id. at 1256. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that the “Wyoming Supreme 
Court would allow an informed consent claim where a physician lies to a 
patient as to physician-specific information in direct response to a 
patient’s questions concerning the same in the course of obtaining the 
patient’s consent and the questions seek concrete verifiable facts, not the 
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doctor’s subjective opinion or judgment as to the quality of his 
performance or abilities.” Id. at 1260. 
 
United States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether the district court commits reversible error 
“when a defendant’s prior conviction merits criminal history points, but 
the defendant does not receive those points, and the district court 
nevertheless imposes a sentence taking into account that prior conviction 
to set the offense level.” Id. at 1147. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that because the defendant’s prior 
conviction was a third-degree felony and carried a jail sentence of 180 
days, “two criminal history points should have been assigned to 
[defendant] for the conviction under § 4A1.1(b), [the criminal sentencing 
statute], as his sentence exceeded sixty days, but was less than one year 
and one month.” Id. at 1149. The court determined that “the district 
court’s error was in failing to assign criminal history points for the 
offense, rather than in calculating the relevant offense guidelines range.” 
Id. Furthermore, the court opined that “the failure to assign [defendant] 
criminal history points for his prior conviction did not change his 
criminal history category, and thus had no effect on his overall 
sentence.” Id. at 1149. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that no reversible error 
occurred in “the district court’s calculation of [defendant’s] offense level 
under § 2K2.1(a)(4), [the sentencing guidelines for offenses involving 
public safety], notwithstanding its failure to assign him criminal history 
points for the [prior] offense.” Id. 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. English, 589 F.3d 1373 (11th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether “a defendant, who was convicted under the 
Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. § 13, and who has served the 
state statutory maximum term of incarceration, may be sentenced to 
further imprisonment upon revocation of his supervised release.” Id. at 
1374. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that it is settled law that “a term of 
supervised release may be imposed in addition to the statutory maximum 
term of imprisonment.” Id. at 1376 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The court then noted that in 
non-ACA cases, it had concluded “the district court had the authority to 
sentence a defendant to [prison time] for violating his supervised release 
terms despite the fact that he had already served the maximum statutory 
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prison term.” Id. at 1377. The court stated that this authority stemmed 
from 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), which “granted the district court discretion 
in certain circumstances to revoke the term of supervised release and 
require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of 
supervised release.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
The court reasoned that the rationale underlying non-ACA cases also 
applied to ACA cases. Id. The primary function of supervised release is 
to provide post-imprisonment supervision and without a court’s authority 
to further imprison, supervised release would lack the deterrent 
mechanism that Congress intended. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that a “district court possessed 
the authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) to sentence [a defendant] to a 
. . . prison term for violating his supervised release terms despite his 
having served the maximum statutory prison term for his assimilated 
crime.” Id. at 1378. 
 
United States v. Florez Velez, 586 F.3d 875 (11th Cir. 2009) 
QUESTION: Whether the exemption in 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) 
excludes the defendants from prosecution for money laundering under § 
1957(a), where the monetary transactions were “made for the purpose of 
securing legal representation.” Id. at 876. 
ANALYSIS: “Section 1957(a) prohibits knowingly engaging or 
attempting to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived 
property that is of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from 
specified unlawful activity.” Id at 877 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
However, the court stated that “the statute exempts any transaction 
necessary to preserve a person’s right to representation as guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted)(citation omitted). Thus, the court found that “the plain meaning 
of the exemption set forth in § 1957(f)(1), when considered in its context, 
is that transactions involving criminally derived proceeds are exempt 
from the prohibitions of § 1957(a) when they are for the purpose of 
securing legal representation to which an accused is entitled under the 
Sixth Amendment.” Id. The court found that, “[a]ccordingly, the 
exemption is limited to attorneys’ fees paid for representation guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment in a criminal proceeding and does not extend to 
attorneys’ fees paid for other purposes.” Id. The court determined that a 
prior Supreme Court decision, holding “that the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel does not protect the right of a criminal defendant to use 
criminally derived proceeds for legal fees[,] . . . has no bearing on § 
1957(f)(1) and indeed supports the conclusion that such proceeds have 
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been statutorily exempted from criminal penalties.” Id. The court 
commented that “[t]he Government has pointed to no principle of 
statutory construction—nor indeed to any legal principle—that supports 
the conclusion that a statutory provision may be ‘nullified’ by a Supreme 
Court decision on a completely different issue, absent any indication that 
Congress intended such a result.” Id. The court found that it “would . . . 
make little sense—and would be entirely superfluous—to read § 
1957(f)(1) as an exemption from criminal penalties for non-tainted 
proceeds spent on legal representation, as those funds can always be used 
for any legal purpose.” Id. at 879. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “the district court was 
eminently correct in holding that [d]efendants are not subject to criminal 
prosecution under § 1957(a), because the plain language of § 1957(f)(1) 
clearly exempts criminally derived proceeds used to secure legal 
representation to which an accused is entitled under the Sixth 
Amendment.” Id. 
 
United States v. Jules, 595 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: “When a district court intends to rely on new 
information in deciding a motion for the modification of a sentence 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), whether each party is entitled to 
notice of the information and an opportunity to respond.” Id. at 1241. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that in deciding the issue, it should 
consider the policy statements accompanying the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines for applicable principles. Id. at 1242. The court 
specifically looked to a policy statement that echoes the spirit embodied 
in Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. That statement 
provides, “[w]hen any factor important to the sentencing determination is 
reasonably in dispute, the parties shall be given an adequate opportunity 
to present information to the court regarding that factor.” Id. at 1242–43. 
The court also relied on 11th Circuit precedent acknowledging the “due 
process right not to be sentenced on the basis of invalid premises or 
inaccurate information.” Id. at 1243. The court further relied on the 5th 
and the 8th Circuit’s conclusion that a party should be afforded the 
opportunity to review and respond to information provided. Id. at 1244. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “each party must be given 
notice of and an opportunity to contest new information relied on by the 
district court in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding.” Id. at 1245. 
 
United States v. DuBose, 598 F.3d 726 (11th Cir. 2010) 
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QUESTION ONE: Whether a “protective order that does not contain 
the precise statutory language of Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) can subject a 
defendant to criminal punishment under Section 922(g)(8).” Id. at 730. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by turning to the 4th and 
1st Circuits for guidance and stated it would invoke “common sense in 
making [its] determination.” Id. The court noted that the 4th Circuit had 
held that a protective order that did not contain “the precise statutory 
language, but ordered an individual to refrain from abusing his wife, 
unambiguously satisfies the requirements of subsection (C)(ii) that the 
court order prohibit the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force.” Id. Next, the court noted that the 1st Circuit had also held that a 
protective order that “directed the defendant to refrain from abusing his 
wife was sufficient to satisfy the statute’s provisions.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit concluded that a “conviction under 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) does not require that the precise language found in 
subsection (C)(ii) must be used in a protective order for it to qualify 
under the statute.” Id. 
 
QUESTION TWO: Whether a “defendant may challenge the validity 
of the underlying state court protective order in a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) 
prosecution[.]” Id. at 732. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit began by noting that “[e]very other 
circuit to address this issue . . . has held that a defendant may not 
collaterally attack the underlying protective order in a Section 922(g)(8) 
prosecution.” Id. The court then surveyed other circuit courts and found 
that the 7th, 9th, 5th, and 6th circuits all relied on a prior Supreme Court 
decision that held that “the federal firearms statute intended to prevent all 
convicted felons from possession firearms, even if the underlying felony 
conviction ultimately might turn out to be invalid.” Id. at 733. Next, the 
court noted that the 6th Circuit had applied the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning to “affirm the conviction of a defendant who possessed a 
firearm while subject to a domestic violence protection order,” and that 
the 5th Circuit also followed and affirmed a conviction upon determining 
that “nothing in the language of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) indicates that it 
applies only to persons subject to a valid as opposed to an invalid, 
protective order.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “protective orders 
satisfying the Section 922(g)(8) requirements are analogous to felony 
convictions for the purposes of the statute’s restraint on the possession of 
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firearms.” Id. Therefore, “the validity of an underlying protective order is 
[] irrelevant to a defendant’s conviction under Section 922(g)(8).” Id. 
 
United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2010) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant’s “conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 
1470 for knowingly transferring obscene material to a person less than 
sixteen years old makes [the defendant] a ‘sex offender’ subject to [Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act’s (SORNA)] registration 
requirement.” Id. at 1351. 
ANALYSIS: First, the court considered “whether a violation of 18 
U.S.C § 1470 is a criminal offense as defined by SORNA.” Id. The court 
noted that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1470 is not expressly 
encompassed under SORNA’s delineated list of “sex offenders.” Id. at 5–
6.  However, the court recognized that SORNA “does not suggest an 
intent to exclude certain offenses but rather to expand the scope of 
offenses that meet the statutory criteria.” Id. at 1352. Second, the court 
addressed “whether [a defendant’s] particular conviction for knowingly 
attempting to transfer obscene material to a minor was a specified 
offense against a minor.” Id. at 1351 (internal quotations omitted). The 
court determined “that SORNA permits examination of the defendant’s 
underlying conduct – and not just the elements of the conviction statute – 
in determining what constitutes a ‘specified offense against a minor.’” Id. 
at 1354. As a result, “Congress left courts with broad discretion” in 
making the ultimate ruling. Id. at 1355. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1470 makes a defendant subject to the registration requirement of 
SORNA. Id. at 1351. 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
In re United States, 590 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 6, 2009) 
QUESTION:  Whether the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client 
privilege applies to the United States as trustee over tribal assets and 
funds. Id. at 1313. 
ANALYSIS:  The court found that there were two justifications that 
support the fiduciary exception. Id. at 1312. First, the fiduciary is not the 
attorney’s exclusive client and acts as a proxy for the beneficiary. Id. The 
court noted that there has always been a relationship of trust and asset 
management between Indian tribes and the government, and that 
relationship calls for application of the fiduciary exception. Id. at 1313–
14. The second justification was that it is the duty of the fiduciary to 
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disclose to the beneficiary all information in relation to trust 
management. Id. at 1312. 
CONCLUSION:  The Federal Circuit held that the United States 
cannot deny an Indian tribe’s request to obtain communications between 
the United States and its attorneys based on the attorney-client privilege 
when those communications are in regards to the management of an 
Indian trust and the United States has not claimed that the government or 
its attorneys considered a specific competing interest in those 
communications. Id. at 1314. 
